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Exploring the potential transition from strategic technology
partnering to mergers and acquisitions
This paper studies a number of research topics derived from the
basic question: do inter-firm partnerships with different
intermediary modes of company organization change over time as
one of the companies that were previously cooperating becomes
integrated by its partner? As such this contribution addresses
the rather ’strong’ variant in such a transformation process
where companies are merged or taken over instead of a
transformation of an equity agreement in which one of the
partners increases its share in the equity distribution of an
alliance. The present analysis is limited to the group of
strategic technology alliances, i.e. those inter-firm agreements
for which joint technology development or technology sharing are
part of the agreement.
The paper first explores the literature that refers to the
possible transition within strategic technology alliances from
contractual to equity modes and from cooperation through
alliances to mergers and acquisitions. Based on this we formulate
a number of hypotheses regarding the change in modes of
governance and several dimensions such as size of firms,
international distribution and industry specificity. The
empirical analysis employs two large data sets, one on strategic
technology alliances and one on mergers and acquisitions. The
major finding of our research is that the transformation from
strategic technology alliance to merger and acquisition hardly
ever takes place. This suggests that alliances and mergers and
acquisitions are not part of a rather smooth continuum but they
are first of all different modes of governance where one mode
certainly does not lead to the other.
1INTRODUCTION
The present research has to be understood in the context of
Williamson’s (1985) well known continuum that reaches from market
transactions via the ’swollen middle’ (Hennart, 1993) to
integrated hierarchical structures such as mergers and
acquisitions. Most of the research on these alternative modes of
organization has concentrated on economic or strategic
implications for firms regarding each of the segments of the
continuum or the trade-off in the choice between these
alternatives. So far little empirical research has been performed
that concerns the possible transitory aspects of different modes
of company organization, e.g. the possible dynamic relationship
between intermediary modes and integration. In short, this topic
concerns the possible transformation of inter-firm cooperation
from contractual agreements through equity agreements such as
joint ventures into mergers and acquisitions.
A small number of contributions link up to the intuitive
understanding of such a relationship between these different
modes with an analysis that stresses an ’encroachment’ strategy
followed by some companies. For instance Doz, Hamel and Prahalad
(1986), Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) and Reich and Mankin (1984)
analyze such strategies in the context of firms that use their
strategic alliances as a vehicle to get greater control over
their partners, whereby some of these partners are integrated
after a period of ’courtship’. However, if we study the vast body
of literature on strategic alliances, cooperative agreements, and
joint ventures that has emerged parallel to the rapid increase of
these inter-firm agreements, we find only very few examples where
2the encroachment thesis is empirically tested or theoretically
further developed. The dynamic relationship mentioned above is
only occasionally studied empirically and then usually only for
some aspects. As will be discussed more extensively below some
studies focus in particular on the transition from contractual
alliances to joint ventures. Other contributions have some
relevance for the understanding of the transition from a
partnership to integration as they demonstrate some patterns in
this relationship as a by-product of a study that investigates a
number of adjacent research questions.
In the following we pay attention to a set of research
questions related to the basic question: do inter-firm
partnerships with different intermediary modes of company
organization, such as contractual agreements and equity sharing
agreements, change over time as one of the companies that were
previously cooperating becomes integrated by its partner? This
question addresses the rather ’strong’ variant in the
transformation process where companies are merged or taken over
instead of a transformation of an equity agreement in which one
of the partners increases its share in the equity distribution of
an alliance. It is estimated that in the eighties and early
nineties about 75% of the strategic technology alliances are of
a contractual nature without equity-sharing (Hagedoorn and
Narula, 1995). Given the predominance of contractual agreements,
which leaves little room for a redistribution of equity, it
appears more interesting to study the possible transformation of
alliances through an encroachment of partners than to concentrate
on the ’weaker’ variant, i.e. the increase of an equity-share in
3a joint venture.
Following the above mentioned continuum our paper
concentrates on the cooperation - integration related aspects of
inter-firm relationships. More specifically it studies five
different modes:
- contractual agreements, in particular joint R&D pacts and
joint development agreements through which companies
undertake innovative projects with shared resources
- joint ventures are combinations of the economic interests of
at least two different companies in a ’distinct’ firm which
also performs R&D or undertakes innovative projects
- minority holdings combined with technology transfer, where
one company has taking a minority share in another company
combined with technology cooperation for instance through a
research contract
- take-overs or acquisitions where one company has obtained
majority ownership over another company
- mergers refer to cases where two separate companies are
combined into one company.
The first three modes are strategic alliances (Hagedoorn,
1993), the latter two are hierarchies in the classical sense of
being modes of governance that are integrated into one company.
In the present analysis we limit the group of strategic
alliances to technology related partnerships, i.e. those inter-
firm agreements for which joint technology development or
technology sharing are part of the agreement. Although this has
some obvious limitations, previous research, for instance Kogut
(1991), mentions the particular role that technology related
4alliances can play in possible take-over activities. In that
context a strategic alliance is applied by at least one of the
partners to assess the strategic importance of the technology
involved. After the decision to invest in a particular technology
is delayed for some time or only partially made in order to
assess the importance of that technology, the company decides
whether it intends to increase its activities through an
acquisition of the alliance or its partner. The particular
strategic importance of technology for the future competitive
strength of companies is a major reason why technology related
alliances are an interesting sub-set of a wider range of
cooperative agreements.
In the following sections we will first explore the
scattered pieces of literature that refer to the possible
transition within strategic technology alliances from contractual
to equity modes and from cooperation through alliances to mergers
and acquisitions. Based on our understanding of the most crucial
and relevant contributions we will formulate a number of
hypotheses regarding the change in modes of governance and
several dimensions such as size of firms, international
distribution and industry specificity. Before we test the
hypotheses we will pay attention to the data sets that are
analyzed, the procedures used to link different data banks, and
the description of the indicators as applied in this study. The
section in which we report the main findings is followed by a
discussion of the these findings in the light of our hypotheses.
Finally, our conclusions set our contribution against the current
understanding of different modes of governance and the particular
5place taken by strategic technology alliances. As our
contribution has a strong exploratory character we will briefly
discuss our main findings in terms of possible consequences for
a theoretical understanding of strategic technology alliances as
a distinct mode of governance and organization.
EXPLORING THE CONTINUUM: PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES
Contractual agreements leading to joint ventures
The first possible step in the transition process of modes of
governance is the change-over from contractual agreements,
through which companies learn to cooperate, towards more
integrated modes of cooperation with equity sharing in joint
ventures. Harrigan (1988) characterizes inter-firm cooperation as
part of ’transitional strategies’, with ’project based ventures’
, i.e. our category of contractual agreements, being replaced by
other ventures of greater magnitude and permanence such as joint
ventures. In a somewhat similar line of work Kogut (1989)
suggests that prior experience of partner companies with other
forms of cooperation can lead to joint ventures of the same
companies. If companies have built a certain degree of trust
based on their joint partnering experience they will force joint
ventures that owe their stability to a history of cooperation.
Contrary to the above mentioned studies Gulati (1995) found that
the larger the number of prior alliances between partners the
less likely it is that their current alliances are equity based.
This could indicate that transitional strategies leading from
contractual agreements to joint ventures are not found that
6frequently.
Hagedoorn (1993), Harrigan (1985) and Osborn and Baughn
(1990) found that high-tech sectors and sectors characterized by
turbulent environments such as information technology,
biotechnology and new materials, which we refer to as new core
technologies, are dominated by contractual strategic alliances
with equity alliances playing a less important role. The research
mentioned above also indicates that in more mature sectors one
will find a larger share of equity-based alliances. In other
words, firms operating in new core technologies are expected to
have a higher propensity to engage in contractual agreements than
those operating in a less high-tech environment where firms share
a propensity to form equity alliances. Therefore, it will be
necessary to analyze the process of transformation within the
population of strategic alliances against their sectoral
background. In that context the transition from contract to
equity-sharing is expected to take place more frequently in those
sectors where firms have a higher propensity to form equity
agreements than in sectors where firms have a preference for
contractual agreements as the dominant form of cooperation.
In order to test whether the transition process within a
large population of strategic alliances does exist and to what
extent there are sectoral specific conditions, we can formulate
the following hypotheses:
1a Allowing for some time-lag, contractual modes of strategic
technology partnering lead to the formation of joint
ventures between the same partners.
71b If the transformation from contractual agreements to joint
ventures occurs, one can expect that a disproportionate
share of the cases of transformation will take place in
other sectors than those related to the new core
technologies.
Strategic alliances leading to mergers and acquisitions
The next step in a possible evolution of inter-firm partnering is
that of the link between both contractual partnerships and
equity-sharing agreements with mergers and acquisitions. As
already mentioned above Doz, Hamel and Prahalad (1986) and Reich
and Mankin (1984) mention that firms can use their strategic
alliances to learn about the opportunity to achieve greater
control over their partner in an acquisition. Also Haspeslagh and
Jemison (1991) point at the possibilities offered by alliances to
encroach a partner before it is acquired. Hurry (1993) points at
the general advantages of incremental strategies through which,
over time, cooperation leads to the acquisition of partners.
Firms that are active in forming partnerships are expected to
create alliances to learn about new opportunities or to use
alliances as vehicles for acquisitions or divesture. Kogut (1991)
analyses joint ventures as an option for firms that can bridge
two basic alternatives, i.e. to wait before one commits resources
and to demonstrate strong commitment through investment. Joint
ventures are then used to asses the opportunity of a new
technology or new product. After the chances of future success
have become more clear the option to acquire is likely to be
8exercised.
In terms of the actual share of joint ventures or other
modes of partnering being transformed into acquisitions we found
only a few studies with empirical results. Berg et al (1982)
found a large share of joint ventures to be transformed within a
few years of operation as over 50 % of these joint ventures were
purchased by one of the parents. In a more recent study
Longfellow Blodgett (1991), investigating a population of 270
international joint ventures, found that only for less than 30%
of the joint ventures the equity distribution was not or hardly
changed. This study suggests that the majority of technology
joint ventures has their equity distribution changed over time as
they are being acquired by one of the partners.
Following tis line of inquiry and extending the analysis
from the change of equity distribution of joint ventures to the
encroachment of partners through strategic alliances, we
introduce the following hypothesis:
2 Strategic technology alliances play a major role in the
formation of mergers and acquisition, whereby one of the
companies participating in a contractual or an equity
agreement is taken over and the alliance is transformed from
shared to single ownership.
Our reading of the literature suggests that very little is
known on the actual time-lag between establishing a strategic
alliance or a joint venture and its possible acquisition. Kogut’s
9(1988) study of nearly 150 joint ventures involving US firms
shows that very few of them were acquired during the first year,
during the following years about 25% of the joint ventures were
acquired. Given this degree of ignorance regarding possible time-
lags we will not formulate a hypothesis on this topic but keep it
as a question as to what time-lag can be reconstructed for
strategic alliances that are acquired.
General conditions affecting the process of transformation
Most of the studies mentioned above do study or understand
strategic alliances in the context of a number of conditions that
shape the outcome of partnering strategies. Ring and van de Ven
(1992) discuss important dimensions that have to be taken into
account such as market power differentials, domestic and
international aspects, and the industry specific context of
partnering behaviour.
Market power and size of firms
Hurry (1993) places part of his analysis of strategic partnering
strategies in the context of the relationship between financially
stronger and weaker firms. He expects stronger firms to take
control over their alliances or acquire their weaker partners.
Research by Berg, et al (1982), Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1994)
and Duysters and Hagedoorn (1995) suggests that larger firms are
more active in partnering than their smaller competitors. The
first mentioned contribution also hints at the possibility that
in case of an unequal size distribution in a partnership, this
10
alliance will probably be dissolved through a take-over. Taken
together with the already mentioned encroachment thesis we can
interpret these findings and suggestions for the relationship
between size of companies and the transformation of strategic
technology alliances as follows:
3a If the transformation from alliances to mergers or
acquisitions occurs, a disproportionate share of these cases
of transformation is between companies of different size-
classes.
3b After a period of courtship through strategic technology
alliances large firms acquire their smaller partners.
Domestic versus international partnerships
Several recent contributions suggest that the domestic or
international character of an alliance influences the particular
organizational mode being chosen. Research by Gulati (1995) and
Hagedoorn and Narula (1995) indicates that international
alliances are more equity oriented whereas a disproportionate
share of domestic alliances are of a contractual nature. This
equity-orientation of international partnering could imply that
control through equity could be further increased through mergers
and acquisitions. As already mentioned above a study by
Longfellow Blodgett (1991) does suggest that international
strategic technology alliances have a high chance of being
acquired. From both a transaction cost theory perspective and a
more strategic management perspective this preference can be
11
explained in terms of the cost of monitoring and keeping control
over a long distance agreement. As domestic alliances are formed
in a familiar environment, equity control is probably less
prevalent in order to monitor the agreement than in the case of
international alliances. Hence:
4 If the transformation from alliances to mergers or
acquisitions occurs, international alliances have a higher
probability of leading to such a transformation than
domestic alliances.
Industry context
Contributions by Harrigan and Newman (1990) and Balakrishna and
Koza (1993) suggest that joint ventures between companies from
similar businesses have a higher probability of being disolved
than those made between companies from dissimilar industries.
Hagedoorn (1993) discusses the importance of technological and/or
market complementarity for understanding the motives of partners
to engage in strategic technology alliances. If this
complementarity is an essential characteristic for successfully
maintaining a strategic alliance, this suggests that
complementarity of partners that are operating in dissimilar
product-markets with little conflict of interests increases the
chances of the combined effort, whereas cooperation between
companies with similar product-market combinations and a higher
probability of a conflict of interests is more likely to be
resolved in a take-over. Therefore:
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5 If the transformation from alliances to mergers or
acquisitions occurs, strategic technology alliances between
companies from the same industry have a higher chance of
being part of a take-over or merger transformation than
alliances between companies from different sectors.
A number of studies reveals that the level of technological
sophistication of sectors of industry affects the distribution of
equity or non-equity modes of strategic technology partnering.
According to Harrigan (1985 and 1988) rapid technological change
in sectors of industry induces the formation of somewhat informal
forms of cooperation such as non-equity agreements. As industries
become mature, more formal modes of cooperations such as joint
ventures become the preferred form of collaboration. Also Osborn
and Baughn’s (1990) survey of the literature suggests that
technological stability of industrial sectors is a crucial factor
in explaining different patterns for equity and non-equity
partnerships. R&D intensive sectors will demand more
organizational flexibility leading to a general preference for
contractual agreements, whereas in sectors with low degrees of
R&D intensity where organizational flexibility is less crucial,
technology partnering agreements will tend to be dominated by
joint ventures. Yu and Tang’s (1992) findings can be interpreted
along similar lines: stable sectoral environments favour joint
venture formation, uncertain environments will lead to a larger
number of non-equity agreements. Hagedoorn and Narula (1995) also
found that high-tech sectors are characterized by a vast majority
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of contractual agreements, whereas the formation of joint
ventures accounts for a disproportionate share of technology
partnering in medium and low-tech industries. This preference for
contractual agreements in high-tech sectors and new core
technologies and equity oriented cooperation in other sectors
suggests that the transformation of strategic technology
alliances into mergers and acquisition could also be unevenly
distributed. Hence:
6 If the transformation from alliances to mergers or
acquisitions occurs, the probability of such a
transformation is lower for the group of transformed
alliances in new core technologies than for the group of
alliances linked to mergers and acquisitions in other
sectors or fields of technology.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In order to find out to what extent strategic technology
alliances lead to mergers and acquisitions we combined data from
two data banks, i.e. the MERIT-CATI data bank on strategic
technology alliances and the Securities Data data set on mergers
and acquisitions. The MERIT CATI data bank contains data on
nearly 13.000 cooperative technology agreements involving about
5.000 parent companies. The information is stored in the form of
a relational database whereby its separate data files can be
14
linked to each other in order to provide data in a (dis)aggregate
and combined form. Preliminary data collection started in 1985.
Since 1987 data on inter-firm alliances have been systematically
collected, including a retrospective search, and the database
currently covers the period between 1970 and 1993. Data sources
include, in general, newspaper and journal articles, books
dealing with the subject and, in particular, specialised trade
journals. Companies’ annual reports, the Financial Times’
Industrial Companies Yearbooks and Dun and Bradstreet’s Who Owns
Whom provided information about dissolved equity ventures and
investments, as well as ventures that we did not register when
surveying alliances.
The database contains information on each cooperative
agreement and some information on companies participating in
these agreements. Cooperative agreements are defined as the
establishment of common interests between independent
(industrial) partners which are not connected through (majority)
ownership. The transfer of technology or the undertaking of joint
research is considered as crucial to these arrangements.
Examples in this respect are joint research pacts and joint
development agreements. In addition data are collected on joint
ventures with technology sharing or which have a joint R&D
program. Mere production or marketing joint ventures are
excluded.
For the purpose of the present analysis information is used
regarding the form of cooperation, the ’nationality’ and the size
of firms involved , the sectors and fields of technology and the
year of establishment of the cooperative agreement. Within the
15
CATI database the form of cooperation is distinguished according
to equity and non-equity (contractual) arrangements. The
’nationality’ of firms has been classified with respect to the
location of the headquarters of the enterprise. The distribution
of firm size is according to employment in five categories (less
than 500, 500 to 5.000, 5.000 to 50.000, 50.000 to 150.000,
larger than 150.000 employees). Within the CATI database there
are 65 classifications with respect to sectors and fields of
technology. A major distinction is made between new core
technologies (information technologies, biotechnology, new
materials) and other industrial sectors. Additional information
on this data bank can be found in Hagedoorn (1993) and Hagedoorn
and Schakenraad (1994), or obtained from the authors.
The second data bank provides information on mergers and
acquisitions. This data bank is property of the firm Securities
Data and can be used via on-line access. Currently it contains
information on about 125.000 worldwide mergers and acquisitions
for the period 1980-1994. This information is arranged in several
data files. For a limited period of time this data base has been
accessed and a specific data sample has been extracted. The
relational form of the data base facilitates the linking of these
data files to each other and also to files in other data banks.
Within the mergers and acquisitions data base there is
information on the different modes of acquisition and the year of
acquisition. In addition, it contains company information on the
acquiror, the target, the parent acquiror and the parent target
firm. The industry information is provided in SIC codes of the
aquiree and acquiror. Unfortunately, the distinction on different
16
modes of acquisition (merger, minority holding, etc.) as made by
Securities Data does not always correspond to the real background
of the acquisition. This is partly due to the character of
information on mergers and acquisition in the trade literature.
For example, a number of cases has been classified as mergers
despite the obvious mis-matches in firm-size indicating an
acquisition. Also, acquisitions are frequently presented as
mergers because of the negative publicity that acquisitions
receive in particular if a foreign partner is involved. As
mergers and acquisitions both lead to integration they are taken
together and considered as one single category.
For the search procedure that would allow us to find any
transition from strategic technology alliances to mergers and
acquisitions we have taken the following steps:
- First, a search procedure was developed that would guarantee
that all partnering firms involved in a strategic alliance
and/or a merger or acquisition in both data banks could be
identified. The actual search procedure applied examined the
parent companies involved in a strategic technology alliance
and/or a merger or acquisition. This procedure ensures the
highest level of corporate control for the analysis with all
subsidiaries that are part of a strategic technology
alliance or a merger or acquisition being included.
- Second, a correspondence in the data fields concerning
industry information in both data banks had to be made at
the industry level. The technology classification in the
CATI data based was adjusted to the SIC code system in the
mergers and acquisitions data base using a correspondence
17
table. As a result, the data on cooperative technology
alliances within the CATI data bank relevant to the analysis
amounted to 6060 strategic technology partnerships. The
extracted amount of data from the database on mergers and
acquisitions corresponding to the CATI data bank amounted to
approximately 16,400 cases. In total about 1900 companies
are involved in either strategic technology alliances or
mergers and acquisitions during the period under
consideration.
- Finally, to examine the probability of a transition from
strategic technology alliances to mergers or acquisitions,
the sub-set of data extracted from the CATI database is used
as the starting point for the analysis. A time lag between
one and ten years is used in order to avoid that minority
holdings and joint ventures were counted twice in the CATI
and in the mergers and acquisitions data bank.
The population of strategic technology alliances under transition
was examined with respect to different determinants that affect
this transition. Following the hypotheses discussed above, these
determinants are sectors and fields of technology, size of firms
involved, and the international character of partnerships. The
results of the examination of these different determinants are
set against the total population of strategic technology
alliances corresponding to the mergers and acquisitions database.
As will become clear from the empirical analysis in the following
sections, the testing of the hypotheses can be limited to simple
statistics.
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EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
The first step in our analysis is the transformation from
contractual agreement to joint ventures with which we remain
within the domain of strategic technology alliances. Out of a
total of 6060 relevant strategic technology alliances in the
MERIT-CATI data bank we found only 84 cases in which a
contractual agreement led to a joint venture (see table 1). If
this intra-partnership transformation took place, the time-lag
was less than 5 years for 76% of these cases, for 26% the
transformation took place within 1 year. As far as the sectoral
distribution is concerned nearly 75% of these cases took place in
the new core technologies, whereas the overall share for these
core technology alliances is about 66% (see table 1). A simple
chi-square test reveals that there is a significant difference
between both distributions (X2=4.6477; significance 0.0311).
---------- insert table 1 about here ----------
We now proceed with the analysis of the transformation from
both contractual and equity based technology alliances to mergers
and acquisitions. From the total of 6060 strategic technology
alliances only 143 cases (or about 2.3% of all relevant
alliances) could be linked to mergers and or acquisitions of
identical partners. If this transition from strategic technology
partnership to merger or acquisition took place, this happened
for 64% of these cases within a relatively short period of 5
years after the partnership was established.
19
Table 2 presents some size-related characteristics of firms
involved with strategic technology alliances that have led to
mergers and acquisitions of partners. About 45% of the firms
involved in this transformation process employ between 5,000 and
50,000 people. The group of large firms with over 50,000
employees have a share of about 19% of this particular group of
alliances. Compared to the overall distribution of the 6060
alliances that we searched in this study the distribution for
alliances in transition is somewhat more skewed as firms with
over 5,000 employees have a share of 71% against 34% for all
alliances. If we consider the distribution of partners from
similar or dissimilar size-categories also involved in a merger
or acquisition succeeding a strategic alliance we see that about
two-third of these alliances are made between dissimilar
companies. However, for the total of strategic technology
alliances the share of companies from different size-classes is
higher as about 77% of the partnerships are made between
dissimilar firms. Set against the total number of 143 alliances
leading to mergers and acquisitions only about 16% refer to cases
where a large or very large company acquires its smaller partner.
---------- insert table 2 about here ----------
Data regarding the (inter)national and sectoral patterns of
the group of strategic technology alliances leading to mergers
20
and acquisitions is presented in table 3. Apparently the
distribution of domestic and international alliances is not that
unequal, although we do see a slightly higher share for
international alliances. If we compare this distribution to the
overall population of strategic technology alliances we see that
the two sub-sets are somewhat different as 58% of the alliances
in the overall population are international. The chi-square test
reveals that there is no significant difference between both
distributions (X2=2.4701; significance 0.1160).
If we look at the sectoral background of companies
participating in these transitory strategic technology alliances
(table 3) we see that about 64% of them are made by companies
from the same sectors compared to 49% for the overall population
of strategic technology alliances. The chi-square test reveals
that there are significant differences between both distributions
(X2=10.6253; significance 0.0011).
As far as the distribution of new core technology alliances
and other fields of partnering is concerned we see some
interesting differences. There is a significant difference
between the share for high-tech alliances preceding a take-over
or merger (56%) and the share for the population at large where
66% of the strategic technology alliances are made in new core
technologies (X2=6.7655; significance 0.0093).
---------- insert table 3 about here ----------
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DISCUSSION
Our findings appear to contradict some previous research findings
or expectations expressed in a large part of the theoretically
relevant literature. Most of the hypotheses, whether they relate
to the relevance of these transformation processes or the
characteristics of the firms and alliances involved, are
falsified. The results are particularly strong as we used two
large data sets combining information on over 6000 strategic
technology alliances with information on 16,000 mergers and
acquisitions of the same group of 1900 firms.
As far as the changes within strategic technology alliances
are concerned only very few contractual agreements are actually
turned into joint ventures. Apparently, the transition from
contractual agreement to joint venture (hypothesis 1a) does not
play any role of importance in inter-firm strategic technology
partnering. For the relatively small number of cases where this
transition did take place the sectoral distribution (hypothesis
1b) demonstrates that, contrary to what was expected, the share
of non-core technologies is higher in the overall population. It
does not seem that this phenomenon of transition into equity
alliances is particularly well spread in sectors where otherwise
equity partnerships are more apparent. In other words, if there
is a disproportionate preference for equity-based alliances in
the somewhat more mature sectors, companies forge these
partnerships without a clear preference for a transitory approach
where contractual alliances are being remoulded into equity
arrangements. In all of this it is important to understand that
the growth of strategic alliances since the early 1980s is in
22
particular affected by the growth of contractual agreements.
Hagedoorn and Narula (1995) mention that during the early
seventies about 75% of the alliances were joint ventures, in the
early nineties the distribution has been completely reversed with
75% of the alliances being of a contractual nature. Contractual
agreements have become the dominant form of strategic technology
partnering and are to be seen as a mode of cooperation sui
generis and not a simple transitory stage towards equity sharing.
Turning to the thrust of this paper the analysis of the
process of transformation from strategic technology partnering to
mergers and acquisition it is clear that strategic technology
partnering plays hardly any role in the process of acquisition
and mergers (hypothesis 2). Only about 2.3% of the relevant 6060
technology alliances related to companies that are active in
technology partnering as well as in mergers and acquisitions.
Given the small number of cases in which the transformation
did take place the statistical analysis had to remain extremely
simple. Also, all findings that provide some understanding of the
transformation process have to be clearly placed against the
background of the limited relevance that this process apparently
has. Nevertheless, our findings regarding some of the
characteristics of the alliances and the firms involved are
interesting as they falsify some hypotheses generated in the
literature as well as some intuitive understanding.
Concerning the dissimilarity of size-classes of companies
that use strategic technology alliances to acquire their partners
or merge with them (hypothesis 3a), it does seem that, as
expected, a majority of two-third of these companies are
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complementary in terms of their size. However, set against a
similar distribution for all relevant strategic technology
partnering this size-complementarity is smaller than expected. In
that context we also found little support for an encroachment
thesis with large firms using their strategic technology
alliances to take over their small partners (hypothesis 3b). The
role of large firms in taking over their smaller partners is
rather limited as this happened in about 16% of the cases where
strategic technology alliances were transformed into integrated
common ownership.
Given the strategic and cost implications of control over
strategic technology alliances one could expect that companies
have a higher preference for taking over their international
partners than those with which they share domestic alliances
(hypothesis 4). Somewhat surprisingly we found a close to a
fifty-fifty distribution for acquired partners from domestic
versus international alliances which is, however, not
significantly different from the overall distribution where a
majority of 58% is of an international nature. Apparently
partners in international strategic technology alliances do not
necessarily run a higher risk of being acquired than if they
form domestic alliances.
If complementarity of partners is a major incentive to form
alliances one could expect that similar sectoral backgrounds of
companies will lead to conflicting interests as companies are
both cooperating and competing in similar or closely related
product-markets. Therefore, the probability of an acquisition or
a merger after an initial stage of partnering was expected to be
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higher for partnering companies from the same sector (hypothesis
5). Indeed, there are significant differences with the overall
distribution suggesting that alliances that are transformed into
mergers and acquisitions companies do not follow the more general
pattern (Hagedoorn, 1993; Harrigan, 1985; Mowery, 1988; Ohmae,
1985) that demonstrates a preference for complementary partners
from other sectors or fields of technology.
In the overall distribution of strategic technology
alliances new core technologies take a dominant position with
nearly two-thirds of all alliances being related to these new
technologies. As discussed above, once technological development
becomes less turbulent and related industrial structures become
more stable equity-sharing could become more important in the
formation of alliances. Following this line of thought we can
expect alliances that are part of a process of merger and
acquisition to be also less focused on high-tech cooperation
(hypothesis 6). Indeed, our findings suggest that a relatively
large and disproportionate share (44%) of strategic technology
alliances that are preceding a merger or acquisition of identical
companies are related to more standard technology exchange and
less involved in new core technology partnering.
CONCLUSIONS
It is important to stress a particular limitation of this paper
which is that our research pertains to only one specific group of
alliances, i.e. those for which the sharing or joint development
of new technologies and joint undertaking of R&D is part of the
25
alliance. Therefore, our results have probably few implications
for those strategic alliances aimed at joint marketing or the
sharing of manufacturing or services. However, in recent years a
growing number of contributions (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994;
Osborn and Baughn, 1990; Mowery, 1988; Mytelka, 1991) stress the
importance that strategic alliances with a large technology
content play in turbulent high-tech industries that will shape
much of the present and near-future competitive environment. It
is also in these industries that we find a dominance of
contractual modes of partnering.
These strategic technology alliances have to be understood
as an important part of a learning process of companies in which
they discover new innovative opportunities in a flexible setting
of a multitude of partnerships (Ciborra, 1991; Hagedoorn, 1995).
Such a learning process in the context of cooperative
technological development is of a complicated nature that
resembles high-tech learning (Lyles, 1994), exploratory learning
(Dodgson, 1993; March, 1991) or double-loop learning (Argyris and
Schon, 1978) as it covers a change of routines, unlearning and
the discovery of new issues in a joint effort. To some extent the
complexity of this learning is due to partner differences
(Parkhe, 1991). However, this complexity is at least as much
influenced by the exploratory nature of learning in technological
development itself, in particular in those industries where
technological change is still of a turbulent nature.
Once this learning process of companies changes towards more
standard information processing and learning and flexibility
become less important for large groups of companies as industries
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gradually mature, integration through mergers and acquisitions
will probably become a more viable option (Ciborra, 1991). As
long as sectors of industry or fields of technology can be
characterized as turbulent environments with high technological
risk (Ring and van de Ven, 1992) combinations of internal
learning and the timely absorption of new technologies through
alliances can be more effective than take-overs or mergers of
(parts of) companies. In other words, for technological renewal
under dynamic-competitive circumstances (Garud, 1994) where
knowledge expires quickly, flexible partnering with capable
partners might be more adequate than an encroachment strategy
leading to formal integration.
In the few cases where strategic technology partnering is
part of a movement along the continuum from contractual and
equity-sharing agreements to mergers or acquisition, it seems
this pattern defies the logic that one could deduct from
scattered pieces of literature on joint ventures and strategic
partnering that point at the relevance of an ’encroachment’
strategy. For instance, large firms are known to be very active
in the market for take-overs and mergers and also in strategic
technology partnering but the latter seems to be applied by them
for other purposes than as part of a transitional strategy. They
certainly do not extensively use these alliances to integrate
their smaller partners.
A major conclusion from this study appears to be that
strategic technology partnering is a different category on its
on. In evaluating the impact of strategic decisions in the
context of integration versus contracting strategies aimed at
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improving the innovative capabilities of firms (Teece, 1987)
there appears to be little room for transitional strategies.
Separate modes of partnering, be it of a contractual or an equity
nature, have different organizational and strategic properties
(Hagedoorn, 1993) but they share their distinctive character that
sets them apart from common governance through integration. In
that sense, there exists, as far as strategic technology
partnering is concerned, and with very few exceptions, no real
continuum which suggests that strategic cooperation is a ’front
porch’ for corporate growth through integration.
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Table 1 Distribution of contractual technology alliances
transformed into joint ventures (n1= 84), overall
distribution of strategic technology alliances (n2=
6060), core technologies and other sectors, 1970 - 1993
Transformed alliances All alliances
Core technologies 74.2% 66.4%
Other sectors 25.8% 33.6%
Total 100% 100%
X2=4.6477; significance 0.0311
Source: MERIT-CATI
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Table 2 Company-size related characteristics of strategic
technology alliances transformed into mergers and
acquisitions, %, 1970-1993
Size distribution Companies in transformed Companies in
alliances all alliances
(n1= 168) (n2= 1893)
< 500 employees 18.5% 38.1%
500 - 5000 10.1% 27.5%
5000 - 50.000 45.8% 26.0%
50.000 - 150.000 19.1% 6.1%
> 150.000 6.5% 2.3%
Total 100% 100%
Alliances with Transformed alliances All alliances
companies of: (n1= 143) (n2=6060)
similar size 32.5% 22.7%
dissimilar size 67.5% 77.3%
- of which dominated
by large firms* 16.3% -
X2=6.7126; significance 0.0096 for distributions of (dis)similar
size
*large firm dominance: combinations of firms >150.000 employees
with all companies <50.000 employees; companies with between
50.000 - 150.000 employees with all companies <5.000 employees
Source: MERIT-CATI and Securities Data - M&A
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Table 3 International and sectoral patterns in strategic
technology alliances transformed into mergers and
acquisitions, 1970 - 1993
Transformed alliances All alliances
(n1 = 143) (n2 = 6060)
Domestic alliances 48.3% 41.8%
International alliances 51.7% 58.2%
Total 100% 100%
Identical sectors 64.2% 49.3%
Different sectors 35.8% 50.7%
Total 100% 100%
Core technologies 56.0% 66.4%
Other sectors 44.0% 33.6%
Total 100% 100%
(Inter-)national distribution, X2 = 2.4701; significance 0.1160
Identical sectors distribution,X2 = 10.6253; significance 0.0011
Core technologies distribution,X2 = 6.7655; significance 0.0093
Source: MERIT-CATI and Securities Data - M&A
